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PARENT-CHILD INCEST: PROOF AT 
TRIAL WITHOUT TESTIMONY IN 
COURT BY THE VICTIM 
Incest between parent and child1 long has been taboo.2 Pres-
ently, it is a civil infraction in all states3 and often leads to crim-
inal penalties as well.4 Despite these sanctions, however, parent-
child incest remains a widespread problem. 5 
1. Sexual abuse is "physical contact between persons at different stages of develop-
ment .•• for the purpose of the sexual gratification of the more mature person." Faller, 
Sexual Abuse, in SocIAL WORK WITH ABUSED AND NELGECI'ED CHILDREN: A MANUAL OP 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE 143, 144 (K. Faller ed. 1981). Parent-child incest is sexual 
abuse by the child's parent. Although this Note applies to all combinations of parent-
child incest, it will refer to father-daughter incest, the most common form. AMERICAN 
HUMANE Ass'N, 1979 NATIONAL REfORT ON SEXUAL ABusE, SPECIAL COMPUTER RUN (Janu-
ary 14, 1981) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTER RUN]. The perpetrator is the parent of the 
victim 68% of the time. Id. at summary sheet 1. The perpetrator is male 85% of the 
time, and the victim is female the same percentage of the time. Id. at Tables 4.1.1 & 
4.1.2. 
2. Commentators agree that incest is and has been rejected by virtually all cultures. 
See, e.g., K. MEISELMAN, INCEST: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OP CAUSES AND EFFECTS WITH 
TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1978); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 363 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE]; Bagley, Incest Behavior and Incest Taboo, 16 Soc. 
PROB. 505 (1969); Machotka, Pittman & Flomenhaft, Incest as a Family Affair, 6 FAM. 
PROCESS 98 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Machotka]; Reifen, The Sexual Offender and his 
Victim, 12 INT'L CHILD WEL. REV. 109 (1959); Renshaw & Renshaw, Incest, 3 J. SEX 
Enuc. & THERAPY 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Renshaw]; Wald, State Intervention on 
Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 
1024 (1975). 
3. Juvenile and family courts treat incest as a form of child abuse or neglect, even if 
sexual abuse is not specified in their jurisdictional statutes. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. 
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OP STANDARDS AND 
STATE PRACTICES: ABusE AND NELGECT 90 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMPARATIVE ANAL-
YSIS]. For example, some courts include incest under "depravity," "moral unfitness," or 
"emotional abuse" provisions, id. at 34, 82, 88, while all states authorize a determination 
of neglect for lack of proper parental care, id. at 46, 90. See also Katz, Howe & McGrath, 
Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975); Wald, supra note 2, at 1024. 
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 90. See also L. Berliner & D. Stevens, 
Advocating for Sexually Abused Children in the Criminal Justice System 2 (November 
1976) (unpublished paper at Sexual Assault Center, Seattle) (child witnesses are "drawn 
into the adult criminal justice system") [hereinafter cited as Berliner]. 
5. There were 360,000 cases of sexual abuse reported to HEW in 1979. Meyers, In-
cest: No One Wants to Know, STUDENT LAW. 29, 30 (November 1980). Between 40% and 
65% of such cases involve parents. Id. (40% of HEW cases); CoMPUTER RuN, supra note 
1, at Table 5.2 (65% of cases studied). Reporting trends indicate that actual incidence is 
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Unfortunately, current legal procedures devised to protect the 
child and to punish or rehabilitate the adult perpetrator actually 
punish the child6 and leave the problem unresolved. In an incest 
case, unlike most child abuse cases, the victim's testimony is 
crucial;" it is unlikely that there will be any other evidence of 
the defendant's guilt. Yet forcing the child to reveal publicly the 
details of sexual involvement with her father exacerbates her 
psychological trauma and deep-seated, though undeserved, guilt 
feelings. Ironically, putting the child through the ordeal of testi-
fying in open court also denigrates the reliability of her testi-
mony. Moreover, directing intervention efforts toward testimony 
in court by the victim prevents successful treatment of the 
causes of sexual abuse. 
This Note argues that the incest victim should not testify per-
sonally at trial. Rather, the child's testimony should be replaced 
with tape-recorded pretrial examinations of the victim by an ex-
pert, supplemented by the in-court testimony of the examining 
expert. Part I discusses how the present system of requiring in-
court testimony by· the victim harms the child, fails to correct 
the incest problem, and produces unreliable evidence. Part II 
outlines and discusses the merits of the proposed reform. Part 
ill examines the proposed reform in light of the defendant's 
constitutional rights to due process and to confront witnesses 
against him. The Note concludes that the proposed reform 
would result in substantial benefits without infringing upon the 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
even higher. Meyers, supra; THE NATIONAL STUDY ON CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORT-
ING, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: NATIONAL ANALYSIS OP OPPICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND 
ABusE REPORTING 5-20 (1980) (reports increased nationally by 71 % between 1976 and 
1979). See also Kempe, Incest and Other Forms of Sexual Abuse, in THE BATTERED 
CHILD 198, 199 (3d ed. C. Kempe & R. Helfer 1981). In general, it is "a problem of 
immense proportions." Giarretto, Humanistic Treatment of Father-Daughter Incest, in 
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 143, 144 (R. Helfer & C. 
Kempe eds. 1976). 
6. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OP THE 
CHILD 64 (1979) ("the harm done by inquiry may be more than that caused by not in-
truding") [hereinafter cited as J. GOLDSTEIN]; Reifen, supra no~ 2, at 116-17; Wald, 
supra note 2, at 1026. 
7. Berliner, supra note 4, at 4; Meyers, supra note 5, at 54. Juvenile courts, on the 
other hand, often make a physically abused child a ward of the court on the basis of 
testimony by caseworkers, doctors, and other adults. Given the physical evidence of 
abuse, the child's testimony is seldom necessary and for that reason, is seldom taken. 
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I. INADEQUACY OF PRESENT PROCEDURES 
A. Effect on the Victim 
The average incest victim is a young female8 who has been 
sexually abused by her father over a period of time. 9 In most 
cases the victim has conflicting feelings about her dual relation-
ship with the p~rpetrator in which she is both offspring and sex-
ual partner.10 As a result, incest often is discovered only indi-
rectly, after other problems draw attention to the child.11 
When the person discovering incest reports it to state authori-
ties, the victim often is taken from her home, which is traumatic 
in itself for most children,12 and is subjected to repeated inter-
views by strangers. is These interviews usually are conducted in 
8. The victim is generally younger than 12. COMPUTER RuN, supra note 1, at Table 
6.4.3 (56% of sexually abused children are 12 or under); V. DE FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE 
CHILD VrcrrM OF SEX CRIMES CoMMITI'ED BY ADULTS vii (1969) (median age of victims is 
11); Berliner, supra note 4, at l; The Child Victim of Incest, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1981, 
at B9, col. l; -Reif en, supra note 2, at 116 (majority of victims under 10). 
9. Incest usually has occurred for "at least two to four years"· before being reported. 
Faller, supra note 1, at 146 (incest may "begin in early childhood and continue until 
adolescence"); Meyers, supra note 5, at 30. See also K. Faller & E. Tickner, Interdiscipli-
nary Management of Child Sexual Abuse 5 (1981) (unpublished paper at the Interdisci-
plinary Project on Child Abuse and Neglect, Ann Arbor, Mich.) ("may persist for 
years"); Kempe, supra note 5, at 199; Wald, supra note 2, at 1025. 
10. The internal conflict resulting from the mix of attachment and revulsion the vic-
tim feels can seriously affect her ability to mature to responsible adulthood. See N.Y. 
Times, supra note 8 ("52 percent of the prostitutes in one penal institution had been 
incest victims"); J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 63 (the "child often becomes either a 
seducer or .•• an inhibited person who is unlikely to enjoy normal sexual activity in 
later life"); J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST (1981); K. MElsELMAN, supra note 2, 
at 29-30 (a higher-than-normal percentage of unwed mothers report incest experience), 
194-261; Kempe, supra note 5, at 199 ("One-half of our runaway girls were involved in 
sexual abuse."); Meyers, supra note 5, at 52 (untreated incest victim likely to be totally 
frigid, be dependent on drugs, or become a prostitute: 75% of one group of teen-age 
prostitutes "had been incestually abused"); B. Myers, Developmental Disruptions' of Vic-
tims of Incest and Child Abuse 3-4, 6-11 (1978) (unpublished paper at the Sexual Assault 
Center, Seattle) (description of extreme effects of father-daughter incest on one victim as 
she grew older). 
11. Incest often is discovered after a teacher or doctor observes a behavioral or physi-
cal problem. COMPUTER RuN, supra note 1, at summary sheet 2 (sources of initial report 
include medical, school, social services, and law enforcement personnel); Faller, supra 
note 1, at 13. The normal practice is to report suspected abuse to an office of the state 
department of social services ("DSS"). DSS may then approach either the criniinal pros-
ecutor or the juvenile or family court prosecutor. 
12. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SotmT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OP THE Cun.o 
31-34 (1973); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 ffARv. L. 
REV. 1156, 1320 (1980) (removal, even from a bad home, may cause "serious psychologi-
cal injury"); Wald, supra note 2, at 993-94. 
13. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal 
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busy offices by people who do· not normally deal with children.14 
The prosecutor, for example, probably has little experience in-
terviewing child witnesses; in addition, the incest victim is but 
one of many complainants he must interview and prepare to tes-
tify. Consequently, when he interviews the child he is more con-
cerned with her ability to convince the trier of fact than with her 
emotional well-being.111 Besides the prosecutor, the child proba-
bly will be interviewed by a variety of other strangers, including 
medical doctors, social workers, police investigators, and perhaps 
even a polygraph expert.16 
After being subjected to these bewildering experiences, the 
child must face the ordeal of testifying in court.17 The experi-
ence of testifying in court can be intimidating even to the most 
secure adult. 16 To most children it is an unfamiliar and frighten-
ing experience, 19 but to the incest victim it can be especially 
traumatic. To begin with, the proceedings may be public,20 re-
quiring the child to relate embarrassing details of sexual en-
counters with her father before a number of adult strangers and 
in the presence of her parents, who are often angry and resent-
ful. 21 In addition, defense counsel may accuse her of lying or 
Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1006 (1969). See also Berliner; supra note 4, at 3, 
13; Meyers, supra note 5, at 54; Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" 
Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status 
of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 
655-56 nn.141-44 (1976). Because the child is likely to be the sole witness, see note 7 and 
accompanying text supra, she is the focal point of attention. Berliner, supra note 4, at 4. 
· 14. Berliner, supra note 4, at 4; Meyers, supra note 5, at 54; see Libai, supra note 13, 
at 986. If abuse or neglect charges are pursued in juvenile courts, the entire process may 
be somewhat better tailored to the child's needs than if criminal proceedings are used 
because the personnel of the juvenile court system are more familiar with the needs of 
children. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 2, at 1027. Although less severe, perhaps, damage 
still occurs in the juvenile system as well. Id. at 1025-26. See also note 21 infra. 
15. Giarretto, supra note 5, at 144; see Meyers, supra note 5, at 54; Reifen, supra 
note 2, at 117 (because of the inherent "focus of the investigation •.. no particular 
attention is paid to the extreme upheavals for the child concerned"). 
16. See D. WALTERS, PHYSICAL AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 118-20 (1975); Mey-
ers, supra note 5, at 53. 
17. Libai, supra note 13, at 1021. A plea bargain may be struck in criminal court or 
services accepted voluntarily .in juvenile or family courts, but neither alternative necessa-
rily will prevent extensive interviewing. 
18. Berliner, supra note 4, at 13. 
19. Id. 
20. Criminal proceedings are public as a matter of course, whereas juvenile and fam-
ily court actions may be closed. 
21. The likelihood of harm to the child is greater in the criminal justice system. This 
is mainly because of the inherent differences between the two systems. First, the primary 
thrust of the criminal system is to punish the wrongdoer, whereas the juvenile and fam-
ily courts have been specially created to protect the child and help the family. See Fox, 
Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack, 
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wanting to hurt her father and family.22 
Current practice further fails the victim - as well as society 
- by ignoring the systemic nature of incest as a family prob-
lem. 23 Adversarial procedures which might be appropriate in a 
case of sexual molestation by a stranger, for example, can 
worsen the individual and family problems underlying parent-
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909). Second, criminal proceedings are more 
formal, more adversarial, and insure the defendant special rights such as the right to a 
jury trial. Third, the juvenile justice system works more quickly, has ties with depart-
ments of social services, and specializes in child abuse and neglect cases. Such differences 
may provide good reason to handle incest cases in the juvenile courts. A number of com-
mentators have noted the advantages of using the juvenile justice system, B. FLICKER, 
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 27 (1977); Besharov, Behind 
Closed Doors, FAMILY ADVOCATE, Fall 1980, at 5 ("remedial services of child protection 
agencies are more effective than the punitive powers of the criminal court"), and the 
harm caused by the criminal system, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 90, 94; 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 363; Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children, in THE 
BATTERED CHILD 153, 154 (2d ed. R. Helfer & C. Kempe 1974) ("A criminal prosecution 
is a clumsy affair." It can "punish," "divide," and "destroy," but not "unite," "rebuild," 
or "arrange."); Wald, supra note 2, at 1027 (criminal penalties "should be eliminated"). 
But see J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 65. 
Although the juvenile system offers many advantages over the criminal system, it also 
causes a significant amount of harm under present practices. As in the criminal system, 
the prosecutor is in charge and the focus is on preparing the child to testify. Only some 
of the people involved in the juvenile justice· system are trained to deal with children; 
few are knowledgeable about the problems involved with incest. For these reasons, im-
proper removal, for example, is as likely to take place under the juvenile system as it is 
under the criminal system. 
22. The father may wish, for example, to argue that the daughter is fantasizing or 
lying. The likelihood that an incest report is merely a fantasy of sexual involvement with 
the child's parent is a myth, according to Goodwin, Sahd & Rada, Incest Ho<n: False 
Accusations, False Denials, 6 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCH. & LAW 269 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as Goodwin]. See also K. MEISBLMAN, supra note 2, at 37-39 (Freud's widely ac-
cepted theory was designed to relieve "the anxiety of therapists" who could not deal 
with the actual, high incidence of incest); Rush, The Freudian Cover-Up, 1 CHRYSALIS 
31, 32 (1977). Yet reports often are attributed to fantasy. Kempe, supra note 5, at 199. 
Other theories such as motives to lie, to protect a boyfriend, see Goodwin, supra, at 270, 
or neurosis, see K. MEISELMAN, supra note 2, at 39, can be explored fully under this 
Note's proposed reform. See pt. Il infra. 
23. Incest arises from a constellation of family problems. See COMPUTER RuN, supra 
note 1, at summary sheet 2; Browning & Boatman, Incest: Children at Risk, 134 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 69 (1977); Faller, supra note 1, at 149-51. An unsatisfactory marital relation-
ship between the parents often is involved. D. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 114, 121, 124; 
Browning & Boatman, supra, at 70 (incest "acts as a homeostatic pressure valve within 
the marital relationship"). For a careful discussion of the problems of mothers and their 
involvement in father-daughter incest, see K. ME!SELMAN, supra note 2, at 111-30. The 
mother may even abet the incestuous relationship. Id. at 112; D. WALTERS, supra note 
16, at 114; Kempe, supra note 5, at 205; Schechter & Roberge, Sexual Exploitation, in 
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 128, 128, 133 (R. Helfer & 
C. Kempe eds: 1976). Social isolation and overcrowding also contribute to the occunence 
of incest. K. ME!SELMAN, supra note 2, at 142; Renshaw, supra note 2, at 5. Furthermore, 
younger daughters may be later victims. Faller, supra note 1, at 146 (successive incestu-
ous relationships occur "often as an older child rebels"); Summit & Kryso, Sexual Abuse 
of Children: A Clinical Spectrum, 48 AM. J. Oamo PSYCH, 237, 245 (1978). 
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child incest.24 As a result, when the victim and perpetrator even-
tually return home, sexual abuse is likely to recur. 211 
All of these factors have a significant impact on the incest vic-
tim. After being removed from her home and subjected to a se-
ries of confusing, frightening, and perhaps hostile interviews, the 
victim feels punished rather than protected. 26 When she returns 
to an unchanged home situation after the legal process has run 
its course she may well feel entirely defeated. The current sys-
tem may protect her temporarily from further sexual abuse by 
her father. But the price she must pay for this questionable ser-
vice is long-term emotional distress,27 confusion,28 and feelings 
of guilt.29 
24. See Meyers, supra note 5, at 51 ("courts only intrude and do not ... give anyone 
..• a chance to work through" their problems). For example, the mother presently is 
forced to choose between her loyalties to the father and the daughter, usually to the 
daughter's loss, especially when the family is dependent on the father's earnings. K. MEI-
SELMAN, supra note 2, at 40 ("Where a father is making .•• contributions •.. [family) 
members will tend to support him and reject the daughter."); Faller, supra note 1, at 
155; Meyers, supra note 5, at 31; Summit & Kryso, supra note 23, at 244. The threat of 
prosecution may also discourage the father from acknowledging his problems. For de-
scriptions of the father and the range of his problems, see, e.g., K. MEISELMAN, supra 
note 2, at 84-111; Bagley, supra note 2, at 92-96; Summit & Kryso, supra note 23, at 717-
24. The likely result is to worsen the problems. See Giarretto, supra note 5, at 152, 157; 
Meyers, supra note 5, at 54 (a "system which takes a father out of the fatnily and puts 
him in jail without treatment is silly and unreasonable"). 
25. See JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 363 (meaningful treatment often must 
involve the entire family). See also Giarretto, supra note 5, at 149, 156; Libai, supra note 
13, at 978; Machotka, supra note 2, at 114; Meyers, supra note 5, at 52, 54. Although 
there appear to be no exact recidivism figures, the likelihood of repeat offenses is great 
according to the current understanding of the father's problems. See, e.g., Berliner, 
supra note 4, at 1 ("child molesting often is a compulsive behavior"); P. DECOURCY & J. 
DECOURCY, A SILENT TRAGEDY: CHILD ABUSE IN THE COMMUNITY [hereinafter cited as 
DECOURCY] (such "personality disorders" are successfully treated only if there is a "de-
sire to change"; "a judgment imposed by others" is not sufficient). 
26. See D. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 114; Faller, supra note 1, at 155; Giarretto, 
supra note 5, at 147. The child is likely to feel that she, not the father, is the wrong-
doer-someone to be "gotten rid or• by removal. Meyers, supra note 5, at 52, 54. Such 
effects are ironic because removal may not be necessary for the child's protection in the 
first place. Faller, supra note 1, at 155. 
27. See D. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 113; Berliner, supra note 4, at 2, 3; Libai, 
supra note 13, at 983-84 (lists aspects of current procedure which may cause "prolonged 
mental stress"); Schultz, Interviewing the Sex Offender's Victim, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 
448, 451 (1960); Wald, supra note 2, at 1026 (criminal proceedings are especially 
harmful). 
28. Giarretto, supra note 5, at 146; Meyers, supra note 5, at 52. 
29. Kempe, supra note 5, at 209; Meyers, supra note 5, at 52, 54; Reifen, supra note 
2, at 116-17, 119 ("guilt feelings may originate from the child himself, or they may be the 
result of outside intervention"); Wald, supra note 2, at 1026. 
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B. Reliability of the Victim's Testimony 
Making the child incest victim testify in court has another dis-
tinct failing: it produces unreliable evidence. The trier of fact in 
an incest case faces a dilemma. Its determination of whether 
abuse occurred rests primarily upon the testimony of the child 
victim,80 but child witnesses are widely acknowledged to be un-
helpful. 31 They have a subjective sense of time, an inaccurate 
memory - especially with regard to experiences such as incest 
which are repeated over time - and a limited ability to commu-
nicate what they do understand and recall.82 These natural disa-
bilities tend to intensify when the child is afraid or under emo-
tional stress, as the child may regress to a less mature state or 
withdraw entirely. 83 Incest victims are especially likely to suffer 
from these disabilities because they are young and find current 
pretrial and courtroom procedures especially traumatic.34 
Compounding this problem is the inability of the trier of fact 
to assess reliably the testimony of this inadequate witness. In 
most litigation, the witnesses and triers of fact are all adults. 
The judge and jurors require no special expertise to assess the 
average adult witness' credibility accurately because they ac-
quire the ability naturally through daily contact with other 
adults. 311 But this ability does not necessarily help the trier of 
30. See text et note 7 supra. As a rule, a child who complains of and describes sexual 
abuse is telling the truth. Conversation with K. Feller, Interdisciplinary Project on Child 
Abuse and Neglect, Ann Arbor, Mich. (October 13, 1981). Nonetheless, the law requires 
that the trier make an independent finding of fact. For this reason, and because the 
charges could conceivably be false in e given case, the judicial system requires reliable 
evidence. 
31. B. CAULFIELD, THE LEGAL AsPECTS OP PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ABUSED AND NE-
GLECTED CHU.OREN 47 (1978); D. WALTERS, supra note 16, et 114; Libai, supra note 13, et 
1003 (citing People v. Price, 33 Misc. 2d 476, 226 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1962) 
(more expertise and e ~etter setting would be preferable for dealing with child wit-
nesses)); see Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 386 (1962). 
32. Berliner, supra note 4, at 5, 6, 12, 13; Meyers, supra note 5, at 54. Additionelly, 
the use of many interviews under present practices reduces the spontaneity end, hence, 
the accuracy of the child's memory at trial. Stem, The Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. 
AB. & Soc. PsYcH. 3, 14 (1939). 
33. Berliner, supra note 4, at 10-11. 
34. Meyers, supra note 5; at 54 (problems with prosecuting incest are so great that 
"prosecutors interested in a good conviction rate won't touch" them); Reifen, supra note 
2, at 116. See also A. LEVIN, EvlDENCE AND THE BEHAVORIAL SCIENCES 514-20 (1956); 
Schultz, The Child as Sex Victim: Socio-Legal Perspectives, in 4 VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW 
Focus 177, 179 (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1973). 
35. In extensive daily interactions with one another, adults rely significantly on non-
verbal cues to communicate. R. APPLBAUM, K. ANATOL, E. HAYS, O. JENSEN, R. PORTER & 
J. MANDEL, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN HUMAN COMMUNICATION 110 (1973) ("We commu-
nicate no more then 35% of our social meaning through the verbal portions of a mes-
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fact evaluate a child witness' credibility.86 Normal adult under-
standing may prove sufficient when assessing the credibility of a 
child witness who is not personally involved with the subject of 
inquiry. For example, in a traffic accident case the only problem 
facing the trier of fact might be to determine whether the child 
witness actually saw the car run a red light. But the problems 
facing the trier of fact in an incest case are more significant and 
problematic, because the child witness is emotionally involved, 37 
is testifying on an especially sensitive topic, and presents a com-
plex question with respect to possible motives for lying. 38 Thus, 
the trier of fact is likely to react with strong feelings but little 
objective understanding in an incest case. 
In summary, the current system of pretrial interviews and in-
court testimony of the victim fails to address adequately the 
unique problems presented by parent-child incest. Not only is 
the child victim exposed to considerable risk of severe emotional 
trauma, but in addition, the evidence presented to the trier of 
fact is unreliable. The next section discusses a proposal for re-
form designed to solve these problems. 
sage."); M. KNAPP, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN HUMAN INTERACTION 12 (1972). Adults 
interpret these cues through familiarity with the range of feelings, concerns, thought 
processes, and forms of expression of adults generally. G. MYERS & M. MYERS, THE DY-
NAMICS OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION 12-13 (1976) (We communicate "seleciively" using a 
"classification system" developed by sorting out our many experiences.). Thus, adults 
obtain needed information from one another by evaluating each other's demeanor. 
Admittedly, any jury may have limited expertise with regard to a given witness be-
cause of differences of race, sex, or class. But such cultural differences, though present, 
are commonly recognized and addressed. Children, on the other hand, are a particularly 
invisible minority. Since knowledge on incest and people with some degree of expertise 
at dealing with incest victims are increasingly available, it would be logical to make use 
of them. 
36. Adults do not commonly interact extensively, if at all, with children. The jury will 
not likely be made up of housewives with children the age and character of the victim. P. 
FRANCIS, How TO SERVE ON A JURY 9-10, 73 (1979) (women in at least nine states are 
excusable on ground of gender alone). Even housewives, though, would not necessarily 
have the ability to assess accurately a child's credibility. Certainly, there is no standard 
measure of the qualifications of parents as there is of professionals. Furthermore, adults 
who interact with children normally do not do so in a context in which they must assess 
the child's credibility. Even juvenile court judges are not likely to have as much training 
in assessing the credibility of children as of adults, if for no other reason than that many 
such judges have neither special training nor experience. See DECouRcY, supra note 25, 
at 12; Wald, supra note 2, at 1001 n.98, 1016 n.168 ("little or no specialized training"). 
Nor are triers of fact likely to recall accurately, much less understand, the feelings and 
thought processes of children. 
The evaluation of a child witness by an untrained adult is especially suspect because a 
child may act like an adult while experiencing entirely different thoughts or emotions 
than an adult. See A. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 526-28; Berliner, supra note 4, at 5. 
37. See Meyers, supra note 6, at 51. 
38. See Goodwin, supra note 22, at 270. 
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II. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
139 
For the reasons suggested in the preceding section, the incest 
victim should not be required to testify in court. Nor should she 
be subjected to a series of pretrial interviews conducted by per-
sons incapable of recognizing and accommodating her emotional 
needs. Under the proposed reform,89 the child's only contact 
with the legal system would be through a specially trained social 
services worker.40 This expert must have dual qualifications: 
first, he or she must be qualified to deal with victims of child 
sexual abuse;41 and second, he or she must be familiar enough 
39. This proposal is based in part on suggestions made by Donald Duquette, Director 
of the Interdisciplinary Project on Child Abuse and Neglect, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and 
on practices in other nations. See Libai, supra note 13; Reifen, supra note 2; Reifen, 
Protection of Children Involued in Sexual Offenses: A New Method of Investigation in 
Israel, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 222 (1959). Mr. Duquette suggests that the child be ques-
tioned in chambers with both parties present, or that a specialist chosen by both parties 
interview the child elsewhere and a videotape be made. 
Mr. Libai suggests, based on practice in Israel and other nations, a special hearing 
with full cross-examination conducted in a "child courtoom." A recording of that special 
hearing would then be used at the trial in lieu of live testimony by the child. Libai, supra 
note 13, at 1028. No jurisdiction uses this procedure to the author's knowledge. Although 
it would protect the victim from being subjected to public view and from testifying 
before her father or a jury, it has the disadvantages of demanding more of judicial re-
sources, failing to protect the child from the traumatic experience of adversarial cross-
examination, and failing to add expertise to the analysis of the child's story. 
40. This expert should have the power to protect the child by limiting access to her. 
The only limits on this power should be regulation on the basis of professional compe-
tence by the expert's supervisor, and the power of the courts to order dismissal of the 
case if necessary access or assistance is not provided. The expert, rather than the prose-
cutor, should have power over the alternative remedy of compelling the child to testify in 
extraordinary circumstances, where both necessary and sufficiently safe to the child to 
justify it. See Westen, Reflections on Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege and Fair 
Trial," 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 371, 373-74 (1981) (noting the "alternative remed[ies)" of 
dismissal and compelling testimony, where assertion of a privilege not to testify threat-
ens the defendant's right to a fair trial). The expert must also consider the child's wishes 
and the need to satisfy the burden of proof. As a rule, however, the child should be kept 
out of court. This shift of power from the prosecutor is necessary to prevent undermining 
the proposed reform. Because of the ongoing professional relationship with the prosecu-
tor, the expert will not unreasonably withhold the child from testifying. Yet the expert 
best knows when the child should not testify despite the likelihood of dismissal of the 
prosecution. Of course, the issue here is not one of fairness to the defendant, for the 
court can prevent an unfair trial by ordering dismissal. 
41. Most counties now have at least one trained professional who could deal with 
sexual abuse cases. Schultz, supra note 34, at 185. See also Alpert & Schechter, Sensi-
tizing Workers to the Needs of Victims: Common Worker and Victim Responses, 4 V1c-
TIMOLOGY 385 (1979). Although these professionals are not all adequately trained, the 
time and expense required to complete training need not be great. Reifen, supra note 2, 
at 119 (training "can be acquired ... easily by professional people trained in the social 
sciences"). Some training in these skills is now available. Faller, supra note 1, at 160. See 
also Giarretto, supra note 5. 
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with legal standards and practices to assist the trier of fact in 
assessing the victim's credibility;'2 . 
Whenever the expert and victim meet, the sessions should be 
conducted in a room designed to facilitate unobstrusive record-
ing and observation.43 If legal action is initiated, both parties to 
the action would then be allowed to observe the interviews and 
submit questions to the expert, who subsequently would pursue 
them with the victim. Questions that arise during a session could 
be given to the expert during a recess. Alternatively, the parties 
and the court could watch or hear the tapes after the session and 
submit additional questions to the expert at that time. This pro-
cess would continue until either the parties are satisfied or the 
expert determines that the child's needs dictate that the limit of 
reasonable inquiry has been reached."' 
At trial, relevant portions of the recordings would be played in 
lieu of the victim's personal testimony. Either party would be 
free to call the examining expert as a witness.411 The expert 
should be prepared to describe the methods used to examine the 
victim, explain relevant information on incest generally, and also 
discuss specific reasons, both in theory and in application, why 
one might believe or doubt the victim's story.'6 The expert 
might also discuss the significance of nonverbal communications, 
A manual, including a role description, an outline of proi:edur.es, readings, and a bibli-
ography on incest and child development could be the major training tool. Conversation 
with D. Duquette, Director, Interdisciplinary Project on Child Abuse and Neglect, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan. The manual could be supplemented with a weekend seminar or per-
sonal contact with an expert or existing program. Moreover, published discussion of the-
ories, methods, and practical experiences would be helpful in developing and improving 
training programs. 
42. In order to be truly helpful in this role, the expert should understand the impor-
tance of objectivity and be familiar with pretrial and trial procedures. Such training 
could be provided by court personnel or through experience. The expert must realize the 
dual purpose of the job: to aid the child and to help the trier of fact rationally decide 
whether to believe the child. 
43. Recording with an audio cassette would be preferable to a printed transcript be-
cause it can convey tone of voice, hesitation, and more. See Libai, supra note 13, at 990. 
A videotape would likewise be preferable to cassette recordings and is often used to re-
cord court proceedings today. In fact, "videotaped testimony sometimes result.a in higher 
retention levels" than live testimony. G. MILLER & N. FoNTEs, VIDEOTAPE ON 'I'mAL 207-
08 (1979). 
44. Once the expert is confident that the child has told everything she can remember 
or has responded fully to all defense questions, there would be no point in continuing the 
interrogation. The expert might also end the examination process if the harm it causes 
the child outweighs the risk of dismissal or loss at trial. See notes 6 & 40 supra. 
45. The court should allow the accused to use leading questions, even though the 
expert is technically neutral, to ensure the opportunity to pursue all lines of defense. See 
pt. m A infra (discussing due process); note 81 and accompanying text infra (discussing 
the confrontation right and rape-victim shield laws). 
46. See note 42 supra. 
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such as gestures or facial expressions, made by the victim during 
the sessions. 
The proposed reform would benefit victims of incest in several 
ways. For example, discussing the incestuous home situation 
with a knowledgeable adult in a private setting will begin ther-
apy, rather than extend the trauma for the child. At the same 
time evidence is being collected for trial, the victim will learn to 
accept herself: although she participated, she is not guilty; al-
though "going public" may hurt her family, it is important for 
her to tell the truth.47 The victim also will benefit greatly from 
the expert's knowledge of the underlying causes of parent-child 
incest. The examining expert will facilitate provision of services 
to the victim and her family by other workers.'8 Prosecution will 
not be the primary focus but one option, necessary only if the 
father does not voluntarily acknowledge his responsibility. 
Fewer trials may be required under the proposal because abus-
ing fathers will see that, although the primary purpose of inter-
vention is to help, the state will have well-developed, convincing 
evidence to convict if prosecution becomes necessary. With no 
trial, the victim will be spared much suffering. But even if the 
prosecution proceeds to trial, the proposed reform will spare the 
victim the ordeal of testifying in court. The victim would not 
have to suffer the emotional anguish that results from publicly 
having to discuss the embarrassing details of her father's behav-
. ior. No one would publicly accuse her of lying or wanting to hurt 
her family. Instead of being a traumatic ordeal of formal, un-
friendly proceedings that exacerbates the victim's problems, in-
tervention will reinforce her self-respect and begin correcting 
the existing damage. 
The evidence obtained using the proposed reform also will be 
more reliable than the victim's personal in-court testimony. The 
expert will conduct the interview sessions so as to minimize the 
victim's emotional stress. This factor in itself should greatly en-
hance the victim's ability to remember and communicate rele-
vant facts.'0 Moreover, unlike the attorneys at trial, the examin-
47. False retractions may be a greater problem than false accusations. See, e.g., 
Goodwin, supra note 22, at 273. 
48. There is presently a danger that the child's needs will be ignored, particularly in 
a criminal prosecution, where the focus is more likely to be punishment of the perpetra-
tor. See note 15 and accompanying text supro. Like any professional involved with a 
child at risk, the expert would, for example, make recommendations to the department 
of social services concerning removal or non-removal arrangements, as is best for the 
child. 
49. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra. It has been suggested that what is 
needed for more reliable evidence is examination of the child by someone with expertise, 
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ing expert presumably will be experienced in dealing with 
children.150 Thus, the expert will better recognize the limits of 
the child's ability to comprehend facts and communicate them 
to others. Additionally, the expert will be available to explain 
these considerations to the trier of fact when the tapes are 
played at trial. Thus, the expert's supplemental testimony could 
significantly enhance the trier of fact's ability to understand and 
assess the credibility of the victim's story. 
Under the proposed reform the parties will have the opportu-
nity to ask questions (through the expert) a number of times 
and on any issue before trial. If the expert fails to address a 
particular topic to a party's satisfaction, that party will have the 
right to submit further questions. Thus, the parties will be af-
forded several opportunities to "examine" the victim. This pro-
cedure should result in a more complete revelation of the vic-
tim's knowledge than would be possible through the ritual of 
direct and cross-examination at trial. Frii-thermore, both parties 
will be free to argue to the trier of fact any perceived inadequa-
cies in the expert's conduct of the interview sessions. The re-
cordings themselves will provide a reliable basis for considering 
such charges. 
III. DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 
PROPOSED REFORM 
Notwithstanding its many advantages, the proposed reform 
must be evaluated in light of its potential impact on the ac-
cused's constitutional rights.111 To be acceptable the proposal 
in a quiet environment, soon after the event is reported and with no time pressure or 
other distractions. Berliner, supra note 4, at 11; Reifen, supra note 2, at 119 (quality of 
first·contact with child and "neutral environment" are "of the greatest importance"). See 
also D. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 135-36. Thus, the child expert should interview the 
child as soon as possible after incest is reported. Recording these early interviews pre-
serves this more reliable evidence for use at any later trial or on appeal. K. Faller & E. 
Tickner, supra note 9, at 17. 
50. See note 41 supra. An adult who can deal with children, ask the right questions, 
and evaluate the answers is necessary. Such a child examiner would know how to develop 
a relationship of confidence and bow to obtain the full story without putting words in the 
child's mouth. Stem, supra note 32. The expert should also be able to recognize signals 
of fabrication through the child's conduct and words. 
51. The proposed reform is intended to apply to all parent-child incest cases, and 
only to such cases. There need be no great concern that the proposed reform would di-
lute the rights of accused persons in other settings. While the needs of parent-child in-
cest victims might appear no more compelling than those of rape victims or abused 
spouses, for example, they are clearly distinguishable. No other type of case involves the 
unique circumstances characteristic of a parent-child incest case. • 
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must not derogate his rights to due process and to confront wit-
nesses against him. The following sections examine the. limits 
and theoretical underpinnings of these rights. Although the 
tapes would be hearsay,152 this Note does not address the hearsay 
issue per se because the hearsay rule reflects essentially the 
same concerns as those of the confrontation clause. The Note 
concludes that the proposed reform would allow for full accom-
modation of the rights of the accused. 
A. Due Process 
The fourteenth amendment118 guarantees every citizen an op-
portunity to be heard114 before being deprived of any liberty in-
terest. 115 To satisfy this requirement the state must allow the ac-
In all cases to which the proposal is addressed, the victim is a child, the perpetrator is 
the parent, and the violation involves a taboo sexual relationship. Not only do the inces-
tuous behavior and society's reaction to it have long-lasting emotional effects on the 
child's growth, personal relationships, and parenting ability, but also the involvement of 
the family and the complexity of the relationship with the perpetrator distinguish other-
wise similar cases such as rape. The incest victim, unlike the witness to intrafamiliel 
violence or the victim of physical abuse, is not only the child of the defendant nor 
merely his adversary witness, but also his accomplice. Her confusion and sense of guilt at 
her involvement is thus potentially far greater than other victims' experience. In sum, 
the trauma to the parent-child incest victim is greater; her usefulness as a witness is less; 
the victim is likely to have positive ties to the perpetrator; and other family members are 
likely to be involved. No other case, however similar in some respects, shares all of these 
complicating factors. · 
52. See FED. R. Evm. 801. The tapes probably would not be admissable under any of 
the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. See id. 803-804. New exceptions to the 
hearsay rule must satisfy two tests. The first test at common law, necessity, does not 
require that the declarant be strictly unavailable to testify, but only that demanding the 
declarant's presence would pose a great burden on the proponent of the statement. See, 
e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 396-97 (5th Cir. 
1961). The second common law prerequisite for admission of hearsay statements is that 
there be sufficient "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. at 395. 
53. The fourteenth amendment reads: "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. The due 
process clause applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings. • 
54. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), the 
Court stated that the opportunity to be heard is the "fundamental requirement of due 
process." Other assurances of a fair trial guaranteed under the due process clause, but 
not affected by the proposed reform, include timely notice, Armstrong v. Mango, 380 
U.S. 545 (1965), assistance of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963), an 
impartial tribunal, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), a speedy trial, 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), and a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257 (1948). 
55. A parent accused of sexual abuse may be deprived of liberty in several ways. The 
most obvious is incarceration as a result of criminal conviction. After either civil or crim-
inal action he may have to attend therapy sessions, accept rehabilitative services, or al-
low intrusive monitoring of his personal life. Moreover, he may eventually lose his power 
to direct the upbringing of his child(ren), since a finding of abuse can lead to termination 
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cused to call his own witnesses and otherwise present evidence 
to establish a defense. 116 
, Adoption of the proposed reform will add to, rather than di-
minish, the opportunity of the accused to be heard. Under the 
proposal, the accused will be allowed to view the tapes that are 
to be introduced at trial. Thus, he will have ample prior knowl-
edge of the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's case.117 
This knowledge will enable him to tailor his defense to his best 
advantage.118 Also, by being allowed to question the victim 
through the expert, the accused will benefit from the expert's 
special ability to test the veracity of the victim's story. 
If the accused believes that the expert's inquiry was incom-
plete, he will have the right to· seek an order for further ques-
tioning or dismissal.119 At trial, the tapes will reflect the expert's 
thoroughness; the accused then can use them to support his ar- · 
gument to the trier of fact. In addition, the expert will be avail-
able for cross-examination. The accused could challenge the 
soundness of the expert's theories and techniques, and elicit rea-
sons to doubt the victim's story from the expert. Moreover, the 
accused's right to call witnesses on his own behalf will remain 
unimpaired.60 Thus, the proposed reform will add to, rather 
than diminish, the accused's ability to obtain information and 
present arguments favorable to him. 
The proposal will contribute to a fair hearing for the accused 
in two additional ways. First, under the proposed reform, the 
trier of fact will be better prepared to ascertain the truth. Pres-
ently, even if the case is tried in juvenile court, the judge is not 
likely to have the expertise necessary to elicit from the child her 
complete story or to assess adequately her credibility.61 Even a 
of parental rights. 
66. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
57. This would put the defendant in a much better position than he is under the 
present criminal system where there is no right to pretrial discovery. 
68. Allowing the defendant to view the tapes might also help to speed the judicial 
process. After viewing the evidence he would confront at trial, the defendant might be 
more inclined to plead guilty or plea-bargain. 
59. The expert would choose between these alternatives. See note 40 supra. 
60. It is unlikely that the defendant could call any witnesses to testify as to the oc-
currence or non-occurrence of the alleged acts. He might want to call an expert witness 
to rebut the testimony given by the examining expert. With regard to the right to compel 
the victim to testify, see the discussion of confrontation at pt. m B infra; Westen, Con· 
frontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 
91 HARv. L. REV. 567, 625 (1978) ("the measure of a defendant's right to produce and 
elicit testimony from witnesses is the same in each case," whether it is confrontation or 
compulsory process). 
·51. See DECOURCY, supra note 25, at 12; Wald, supra note 2, at 1001 n.98, 1016-17 
n.168. 
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judge who does have .such expertise probably lacks the time it 
takes to conduct a thorough interrogation of the child. Under 
the proposal, the trier of fact will have the benefit of a neutral 
third party's reasoned analysis and advice. Thus, just as the ac-
cused will have a better opportunity to present his def ens es 
under the proposal, so too will the trier of fact have a better 
opportunity to make a fair, well-reasoned decision.82 
Finally, the proposal will contribute to the father's right to a 
fair hearing by depriving the prosecutor of the prejudicial effect 
of the child victim's presence in court. A jury understandably 
might sympathize with a frightened child as she testifies, espe-
cially during cross-examination. An entirely different effect can 
be achieved by showing the child on tape, quietly talking with 
the expert. The facts will be presented to the jury more thor-
oughly and with less emotion. 
B. The Confrontation Right 
The sixth amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . , to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him."68 The Supreme Court has said 
62. See discussion of the weakness of the present system in pt. I B supra; Note, State 
Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 
1398 (1974} ("A judicial decision maker simply is not in a position to render reasoned 
principled judgments on child welfare issues without hearing particularized expert 
evidence."). 
63. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
The Supreme Court has not answered definitively the question of whether the con-
frontation clause applies in civil trials for child neglect or abuse. The Court has gone 
only so far as to hold that the confrontation clause applies to a juvenile court proceeding 
in which the juvenile faces the possibility of incarceration. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 
(1967}. One might argue that, because the accused are adults rather than children, and 
because the serious risk of termination of parental rights is involved, the confrontation 
right should be extended to child abuse cases. Yet in at least two major cases, the Su-
preme Court has declined to extend comparable protections to cases handled in juvenile 
and family courts. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2163 
(1981) (appointment of counsel, although required by the sixth amendment in criminal 
cases, and "enlightened and wise" in civil cases, is not constitutionally required in every 
termination-of-parental-rights case); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540, 545 
(1971) (extending the constitutional right to jury trial to all juvenile actions would 
"likely be disruptive of the unique nature of the juvenile process," "put[ ting] an effective 
end to ... the ••• prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding"). The anal-
. ysis employed in these cases suggests the Court would treat the confrontation right 
similarly. 
This Note deals with the confrontation clause, nonetheless, because criminal courts 
often are used in incest cases, and because some state courts may independently apply 
the confrontation right in civil cases. For example, in In re S. Children, 102 Misc. 2d 
1015, 1017-18, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1005-06 (Family Ct. 1980), the court held that the 
right of confrontation, applicable through the fourteenth amendment, could not be de-
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that the purpose of the confrontation clause is to assure that 
"the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the 
truth of the prior statement."64 Cross-examination of the declar-
ant in court normally serves this purpose.e11 When conducted by 
a skilled lawyer, cross-examination can be very helpful to the 
trier of fact assessing a witness' credibility.ea In incest cases, 
however, special problems67 complicate matters, effectively ne-
gating the value of cross-examination. This Note contends that 
where the traditional rationale underlying the confrontation 
clause would best be served by alternate methods, the confron-
tation clause does not require cross-examination in court. 
The Supreme Court_ has never said that the confrontation 
clause mandates cross-examination in every case.es As applied 
nied a father charged with incest absent "justifiable circumstances." Such circumstances, 
the court explained, include "[t]ender years, mental health, behavior in the courtroom, 
[and] the need to shield some children from the emotional trauma certain disclosures 
would be likely produce." These are factors which could significantly limit the assertion 
of the right by the father in incest cases. See also N.Y. FAMILY CT. LAW § 1046(a)(vi) 
(McKinney 1975)("previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations of 
abuse or neglect shall be admissible"); P. PRESCOTT, THE CHILD SAVERS: JUVENILE Jus-
TICE OBSERVED 116 (uncorrected. proof 1981). 
64. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 161 (1970)). Some of the concerns present in evaluating the truth of prior state-
ments are prejudice; mistake of identification due to error, deceit, or memory; and the 
· opportunity of the defendant to avoid these dangers. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66-73 
(1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 215 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 
(1970). See also Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rule, allfl Due Pro-
cess-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 
CONN. L. R2v. 529, 532 (1974) (the clause is a "constitutional barrier against such 
flagrant abuses as trial by anonymous accusers"); Graham, The Right of Confrontation 
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99-101 
(1972) (the confrontation clause is intended to prevent conviction by an untested and 
later recanted confession of an alleged co-conspirator); Younger, Hearsay and Confron-
tation, Or What Every Criminal Defense Lawyer Should Have in Mind When He Ob-
jects to the Prosecutor's Offer of Hearsay, 2 NAT'L. J. CRIM. DEF. 65, 66 n.4 (1976). 
65. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-58 (1970); Westen, supra note 60, at 574-81 
· (discussing rights of the accused to have present, and to cross-examine, witnesses against 
him). 
66. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); Mattox v. United States, 156 
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (cross-examination allows "testing the recollection and sifting the 
conscience of the witness . . • face to face with the jury in order that they may . • • judge 
by his demeanor whether he is worthy of belier'); Libai, supra note 13 (quoting Pointer 
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965)). The "ordeal of cross-examination," Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. at 244, has been called the "greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth." California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 J. W1GMORB, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1367 (rev. J. McNaughton 1961)). 
67. See pt. I B supra. 
68. The confrontation right and cross-examination are not coextensive. The belief 
that they are is "an understandable misconception." California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 172-
73 (Harlan, J., concurring). See Westen, supra note 60, at 584 ("The Court has invoked 
the confrontation clause to prohibit the state from using an out-of-court statement only 
where the same evidence was available and capable of being produced in more reliable 
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by the Court, the confrontation clause is not an absolute rule 
but an expression of the tension between two policies. 69 The first 
policy is that an innocent party should not be wrongly con-
victed.10 If this were the only policy behind the confrontation 
clause, the right would be absolute: any criminal defendant 
would be able to force the prosec:ution to make its case through 
testimony in court or risk dismissal. But a second policy -
against setting a guilty criminal free - requires considering al-
ternatives to dismissal where the prosecution cannot produce a 
witness to give crucial testimony in court. As a result, the Su-
preme Court has long recognized the exceptions of dying decla-
rations11 and prior testimony of unavailable witnesses12 as in-
stances where, because of the need for crucial evidence, prior 
out-of-court statements may be admitted into evidence without 
cross-examination of the declarant at trial. These exceptions are 
characterized by the unavailability of the declarant and the 
presence of circumstances which indicate that the statements 
are reliable. The rationales which combine to justify the two 
well-established exceptions support the proposed reform as 
well.13 
form" in court.) But cf. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (treating cross-examina-
tion as a constitutional right under the confrontation clause). 
69. The unconditional wording of the confrontation clause does not give it an unqual-
ified scope. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (to do so "would abrogate virtually 
every hearsay exception"); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Micu. L. REv. 1185, 
1200-01 n.65 (1979); Younger, supra note 64, at 37. Strictly worded constitutional rights 
regularly are enforced pragmatically rather than woodenly. For example, the Supreme 
Court held, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951), that the first amend-
ment command that Congress make no law abridging free speech "is not an unlimited, 
unqualified right, but . . • must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and 
considerations." 
Similarly, the confrontation right has not been applied absolutely: it can be waived, 
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357-59 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing express 
waiver, waiver by stipulation as to admission of evidence, waiver by guilty plea, waiver 
by absence from the jurisdiction, and waiver by misconduct); its denial may be harmless 
error, Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1979); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 
430-32 (1972); it has been held subject to balancing with other interests, Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)); Mattox 
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (rules such as the confrontation right "must 
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case"); 
and it is subject to exception, see, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). 
70. See Baker, supra note 64, at 532-34; Graham, supra note 64, at 99-101; Younger, 
supra note 64, at 32 n.4. 
71. Clyde Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). See generally McCoR-
MICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§§ 281-297 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [herein-
after cited as McCORMICK]. 
72. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 242, 240-44 (1895). See generally McCORMICK, 
supra note 71, at §§ 254-261. 
73. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) ("There are other analogous excep-
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1. Policy basis for an exception-The two traditional excep-
tions to the confrontation clause apply when the declarant is not 
available to testify at trial.74 Nevertheless, the courts have not 
required absolute unavailability, but have considered it a discre-
tionary matter based on a policy against incurring excessive 
costs or delay711 as well as the policy against letting the guilty go 
free. As a result, if a court finds that procuring a critical witness 
would entail inordinate expense or delay, it will find that witness 
unavailable. 78 
Although the victim of parental sexual abuse is physically 
available to testify if the state so requires,77 equally strong pol-
icy considerations justify recognizing an exception in such cases. 
The justification actually is greater where the expense of secur-
ing live testimony is measured in human costs rather than time 
or money.78 Forcing the incest victim to testify at trial is costly 
indeed from the standpoint of both the victim and society.79 
tions which might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confronta-
tion of witnesses."). · 
74. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
75. For example, the court must decide whether the state has made sufficiently dili-
gent effort to find the declarant or procure his presence. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 
U.S. 204, 209-13 (1972) (declarant had moved to Sweden); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 
722-25 (1968) (witness incarcerated in federal prison outside the state); Motes v. United 
States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900) (declarant disappeared from the courthouse after being 
left in the custody of another witness); United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 800-01 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (witness had returned to his home in Mexico). 
76. E.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 209-13 (witness who had moved to Sweden 
found to be unavailable). Also, the state must make good-faith efforts to procure the 
presence of the declarant. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 725. 
77. Because the victim is physically available, some commentators have assumed that 
reform of the type suggested would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Libai, supra note 13, at 
1025-26. 
78. Our system of justice manifests a concern with human costs at many levels. The 
eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and prisons, despite their 
problems, attempt to provide for more than mere physical survival. Bankruptcy proce-
dures protect enough of the assets to cover necessaries. Tort law struggles to develop a 
fair system for compensating victims' loss of companionship and mental distress. Most 
pertinent here are the informal procedures and the "best interest" standards of the juve-
nile/family courts. 
Furthermore, it is as sensible to establish an exception to protect the incest victim 
from trauma as it is to protect the taxpayer from expenditure and the accused from 
delay. The only difference between the first and the latter two harms is the value at risk. 
In light of the fact that money and time have recognizable value only in relation to 
human needs and values, the cost in harm to a person must be valued at least as highly 
as money and time. 
79. See pt. I supra. Society suffers in three ways from currently used, inappropriate 
procedures. First, the incest problem remains because the emphasis on prosecution with 
in-court victim testimony prevents proper treatment of its causes. See notes 23-25 and 
accompanying text supra. Second, money spent to prosecute and punish the perpetrator 
is largely wasted. Id. Third, the integrity of the judicial system suffers when it must pass 
judgment without a rational basis for decision. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text 
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Furthermore, even if dollar costs alone were the standard, it 
would be in the state's interest to resolve rather than aggravate 
the incest problem. 80 Policy considerations of all types argue 
strongly for recognizing a new exception in the special circum-
stances of parent-child incest. 81 
2. Reliability of the evidence- To fit under one of the ex-
ceptions to the confrontation clause, the out-of-court statement 
must arise in circumstances which suggest that it is reliable .. 
Under the dying declaration exception, it has been assumed his-
torically that something said under a "sense of impending 
death" is likely to be true.82 Whatever the merits of this assump-
tion, the rule clearly is a legal fiction. As such, it provides little 
help in analyzing the strictures of the confrontation clause. 
The basis of reliability of prior testimony of an unavailable 
witness provides better guidance. Prior testimony by an unavail-
able witness is considered reliable because it arose during a prior 
hearing at which the accused had an opportunity to challenge its 
truthfulness.83 This requirement should be a demanding assur-
ance of reliability, but in practice it is not rigorously applied. 
For example, actual cross-examination by the defendant. at the 
supra. Use of the proposal will allow the state to overcome these problems. 
80. In 1969, the annual national cost of foster care alone, not counting other services 
to families, was $363 ·million. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 30 
(1978). The cost is much higher today. For example, New York City figures indicate that 
some expenses have more than doubled. Id. Furthermore, the cost of institutionalized 
care far exceeds the cost of foster family care. S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S 
RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN 108 n.11 (1971); J. PERS, GOVERNMENT AS PARENT: AD-
MINISTERING FosTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA 77 n.4 (1976) (institutional care four times as 
high as foster family care). 
81. The proposed reform is consistent with the holding of the Supreme Court, in 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1975), that a defendant's confrontation right out-
weighs the policy of keeping juvenile records privileged. The degree of potential harm to 
the minor was very different in Davis. The Court characterized it as a "temporary em-
barrassment." Id. at 319. In contrast, the risk to the parent-child incest victim is signifi-
cant, direct, and of potentially long-lasting psychological effect. See pt. I A supra. Fur-
thermore, unlike the lower court's enor in Davis, use of the proposal does not block 
pursuit of any defense theory, such as bias for the witness, which might do "serious 
damage to the strength of the State's case." 415 U.S. at 319. 
For the same reason, the proposed reform avoids the major weakness of rape shield 
laws. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 
128 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 544, 545, 571 (1980) (arguing that some shield laws violate the con-
frontation clause because they block all inquiry into some issues and involve per se 
exclusionary rules). See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape 
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1977). The proposal is essentially a 
procedural change, and does not prevent inquiry into any given issue. It also leaves the 
judge discretion to order dismissal if necessary to avoid unfairness to the accused. 
82. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1898). 
83. McCORMICK, supra note 71, at § 255. 
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prior hearing is not essential.84 Instead, and more helpfully, the 
Court has turned to the generalized concept of "indicia of relia-
bility"86 - indications that there is adequate reliability to "af-
ford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth 
of the prior statement."86 Using the Court's analysis, a prior 
statement by the unavailable witness bears "indicia of reliabil-
ity" if it (1) is not inherently deceptive, (2) raises no problems of 
false identification or faulty recollection, (3) was made in cir-
ctllilstances not suggesting a motive to lie, and ( 4) was given 
under oath (5) in a judicial hearing which provided a reliable 
record (6) at which the accused was :represented by counsel, and 
(7) at which the accused had an adequate opportunity to ques-
tion the witness through cross-examination or its equivalent in 
form and purpose.87 Under the proposed reform, the out-of-
court testimony by the victim will bear several of these indicia of 
reliability supplemented by other "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness. "88 
The tapes, along with the expert's testimony, will reveal (1) 
whether the victim's statements were inherently deceptive, (2) 
whether there were problems of faulty recollection,89 and (3) 
whether the child's circumstances suggest a motive to lie. Addi-
tionally, the tapes will provide as accurate a record as is 
possible. 
The purpose of the oath is to ensure that the witness under-
stands the importance of telling the truth.90 In most cases in-
volving child witnesses, an informal examination by the judge 
serves this purpose. 91 However, a specially trained expert would 
better be able to communicate to the child the importance of 
telling the truth, and also to evaluate the child's comprehension 
of it.92 
Although the proposal contemplates representation by coun-
84. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980). 
85. See id. at 65-66, 70-71 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970)); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). The Court has never required that any par-
ticular factor or set of factors be present in every case. 
86. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972). 
87. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 70-71 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 
U.S. at 215-16; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). 
88. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
89. Considering the nature of the offense, it is not likely that there will be problems 
of identification. 
90. McCORMICK, supra note 71, at § 245. 
91. See Annot., supra note 31, at 389 (court must establish, for example, that the 
child believes it is wrong to lie and that she will be punished if she does). 
92. See notes 42, 49-50 supra. 
FALL 1981) Proving Parent-Child Incest 151 
sel,93 it does not anticipate cross-examination of the victim at 
trial.94 Indeed, the absence of in-court cross-examination is cen-
tral to the proposal. Nonetheless, the proposal does offer at least 
the equivalent of cross-examination. The testimony obtained 
under the proposal would be more reliable than can presently be 
obtained through cross-examination because the defendant 
would be allowed to question the victim through .the expert. The 
information obtained through this procedure would be highly re-
liable because (1) the proposal mandates an early interview, in a 
setting conducive to the child's needs and the parties' observa-
tion; (2) the expert would be especially qualified to elicit rele-
vant information from the victim; (3) defense counsel would 
have several opportunities to ask questions; (4) the expert would 
be available later to answer questions; and (5) recording the in-
terviews would assure thorough efforts to discover the truth. 95 
Thus, according to these "indicia of reliability," the reliability 
of evidence under the proposed reform would be at least equal 
to, if not greater than, that normally associated with prior testi-
mony of an unavailable witness. It would be ironic indeed to re-
ject the proposal because it does not allow for strict confronta-
tion, when it would provide a more satisfactory basis for 
evaluating the truth of the child's allegations - the very pur-
pose of the confrontation clause. 
CONCLUSION 
The state currently intervenes in cases of parent-child incest 
with procedures which are inappropriate to the needs of the vic-
tim and society. These procedures aggravate the emotional 
trauma of the victim, fail to address the causes of incest, and 
93. The proposal actually goes one step further. It establishes a minimum standard of 
competent representation: preparation by listening to the tapes, submitting questions, 
and developing arguments for court. 
94. In view of the opportunities which the proposal gives the father ~ raise defenses, 
a face-to-face encounter could provide little more than a chance to intimidate the child. 
While having an opportunity to try to "break down" the witness is no doubt an oft-used 
tradition, when the witness is a child - especially an incest victim - the tradition can 
lead to little but harassment, which is not a legitimate reason to allow cross-examination. 
See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133 (1968) ("There is a duty to protect [a witness] 
from questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to har-
ass, annoy or humiliate .•.. ") (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692-94 
(1931)). 
95. Knowing that the tapes will be shown at trial will encourage the expert to do as 
thorough a job as possible. The parties' ability to ask questions through the expert also 
should promote thoroughness. 
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provide unnecessarily unreliable evidence at trial. This Note 
suggests an effective solution to these problems which is consis-
tent with the constitutional rights of the accused to confronta-
tion and due process. 
-Dustin P. Ordway 
